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Abstract. The option of decarbonisation of the European
power sector with the help of significant imports of renew-
able electricity from North Africa via a trans-continental
electricity Supergrid is increasingly gaining attention. In
this paper, we investigate the geopolitical risks to Euro-
pean energy security in such a future, and discuss corner-
stones for possible policy strategies to reduce these risks.
The strategies are rooted in the interdependence between
exporter and importer. We come to the conclusion that fos-
tering and deepening, as opposed to reducing, the depen-
dence of both sides on each other may be a valuable and
powerful way to reduce the geopolitical risks of renewable
electricity trade between Europe and North Africa.
Keywords. energy security, Desertec, Supergrid, renew-
able electricity, interdependence.
1 Introduction
If Europe wants to stand a fair chance of reaching its long-
term decarbonisation targets – at least 85% greenhouse gas
emission reduction by 2050 – and shoulder its part of the
global work to avoid dangerous climate change, the Euro-
pean power system has to be completely decarbonised in the
coming four decades. On the electricity supply side, there
are at least three principle ways of doing this: (1) expanding
nuclear power, while solving its economic difficulties and
accepting the environmental and safety risks involved with
this technology; (2) developing carbon capture and storage
technologies and accompanying infrastructures and apply-
ing these in a large scale to fossil fuel power generation;
or (3) expanding renewable generation technologies and its
accompanying infrastructures [1–5].
In this paper, we focus on the renewable option, which
is an option that holds great promise: the technological and
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economic development of renewable generation technolo-
gies have made enormous progress in recent years, with on-
shore wind and biomass power approaching cost parity with
conventional generation, and photovoltaic power (PV) at or
below grid parity in most European countries. Other tech-
nologies, in particular offshore wind and concentrating so-
lar power (CSP) are developing technologies, and are likely
to undergo similar learning and cost reduction process over
the coming decade [6]. Although the renewable genera-
tion technologies are still not fully mature, their prospects
look bright and the large number of different technologies
and concepts for expanding renewables offers a number of
potentially viable ways to decarbonise the European power
system.
2 Background: the Supergrid
In recent years, the idea of a Supergrid has emerged as
one of the dominant paradigms for achieving very high lev-
els of renewables. The Supergrid interlinks very large ar-
eas through a highly efficient high-voltage direct current
(HVDC) power grid, which operates as an overlay grid on
top of the HV alternating current grid. In many such sce-
narios, the Supergrid spans not only all of Europe, but also
crosses the Mediterranean Sea. In these scenarios, Europe
imports a significant share of its renewable power from
North Africa. There are three main reasons why such an
intercontinental Supergrid solution could be preferable to
Europe compared to other renewables-based power system
decarbonisation pathways:
 the solar power resources are much better in the deserts
of North Africa than in Europe, which also offer large
and very good potentials for wind power. Including
these areas in the European power system could lead
to significantly lower generation costs, also including
transmission costs, than if Europe remains alone;
 the fluctuations of both intermittent renewables and –
to a lesser extent – demand are stochastically smoothed
over very large areas, so a European-North African Su-
pergrid would reduce the system costs for renewables
by minimising the need for storage and by making the
system more reliable and predictable;
 the land area and renewable resources within Europe
may not be large enough to supply all of Europe’s elec-
tricity needs in an economically viable fashion, while
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respecting ecological, acceptance and land-use com-
petition, but the combined European-North African
resources are large enough for almost any future de-
mand [7–13].
Thus, the Supergrid proponents conclude that, from a tech-
nical and economical perspective, the risks associated with
a Supergrid will be lower – i.e. cheaper and more reliable –
than a European-only renewables-based decarbonisation.
Despite this, an electricity future in which Europe de-
pends on imports from North Africa for a substantial share
of its electricity consumption raises fears of geopolitical
risks and the “energy weapon” – of the exporters using the
electricity trade and the European dependency to gain po-
litical leverage over Europe [14, 15]. Such extortion events
have happened in other energy markets: the 1973 oil crisis
and the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis are prominent
examples. For a Supergrid system, this may be a challenge
of a different quality than for other decarbonisation options:
although Europe already today imports large shares of its
primary energy, and nuclear and CCS futures would need to
do so too, importing renewable electricity could introduce
new geopolitical risks. In the following, we will dissect
these “energy weapon” concerns, in order to identify possi-
ble strategies to increase the European geopolitical energy
security in a possible Supergrid future.
3 Strategies for Minimising Political Electricity
Import Risks: Managing Interdependence
There are two general ways to minimise risks: one can ei-
ther minimise the impact or the probability of an event. For
the importer, the potential impacts of an energy weapon
event are the main concern, and measures to minimise them
is a primary strategy to reduce risk. The exporter’s tool in an
energy weapon event is to inflict (or threaten to inflict) dam-
age on the importer by cutting the energy deliveries. The
impact – for example the damages inflicted on the importer
– of such an event becomes a primary determinant for the
attractiveness of the “energy weapon”, and thus also for the
probability of the event. This is valid even if the exporter
only threatens to cut deliveries: if the threat is credible and
strong, an actual disruption may not be necessary. Conse-
quently, to be able to assess the risks of extortion events,
one must understand their anatomy and especially what the
impacts on the involved actors are.
Trading electricity – or energy, or any other commodity –
leads to interdependencies. Talking solely about import de-
pendence is misleading: both the seller and the buyer have
benefits of the trade, and thus both depend on it, to vary-
ing degrees. Focusing only on the importer’s dependence
removes the context of the issue, as import dependence is
not a dangerous thing per se. Instead, the interesting ques-
tion concerns the symmetry and quality of the trade: if one
actor depends more on the trade than the other, then the less
dependent actor can potentially use the trade as a source of
bargaining power [16]. This logic works even stronger if
the traded good, or the revenues from the trade, is a vital
part of the economic activity of a country. Electricity is in
this sense a more intense good than other energy carriers,
for a number of reasons. First, all modern economic activ-
ity comes to a halt if the electricity supply is interrupted,
which indicates a high importer vulnerability. In addition,
supply and demand have to match at every time, or sys-
tem instability or blackouts are the likely result. As elec-
tricity is grid-bound, substitution resources in the case of
a disruption (such as reserve capacities) are restricted by
the already existing infrastructure, which increases the in-
terdependence between exporter and importer compared to
other energy carriers, like oil. Further, whereas oil and gas
can be stored in meaningful quantities, or left in the ground
and sold at a later time, renewable electricity is a perishable
good which is either sold and consumed momentarily, or it
is lost. Hence, the impacts of a politically motivated elec-
tricity export disruption are more direct – they start at the
instant the disruption begins – and affect both the importer
and the exporter stronger than a similar event in the gas or
oil supply system. Therefore, analogies to geopolitical risks
in the gas and oil systems may be incorrect (see also [17]),
as the systems are different.
In a recent paper [18], we investigate the interdepen-
dence and power symmetry in detail for the Desertec sce-
nario, a Supergrid scenario foreseeing 100 GW, or about
17% of the European demand, renewable electricity imports
from North Africa in 2050 [7, 13]. The conclusion of that
article is that Europe is not particularly vulnerable to export
cuts, for two main reasons.
First, Europe is likely to be able to restore system opera-
tions following all but the most extreme disruptions, as the
magnitude of the imports from a given country is too low
to exceed Europe’s response capacities (mainly control and
spare capacities, as well as demand reductions). In almost
all cases, the blackouts are limited geographically and the
system is likely to be reignited within hours; the impacts on
the European economy are small and temporally limited.
The second reason is closely related, and leads us further
towards possible strategies to minimise risks. Following an
export cut, Europe first faces high blackout costs, but after
a few hours the costs are minimal (caused by the slightly
higher costs of reserve generation). The exporter, on the
other hand, faces constant costs, originating in lost income,
at a higher level than the European reserve generation costs,
until the exports are resumed. As a consequence, the ex-
porter has no leverage: Europe can simply wait the exporter
out.
This result leads to a number of cornerstones for possi-
ble strategies to minimise the European geopolitical risks
in a Supergrid future. The key to this lies in managing and
fostering the interdependence between Europe and the ex-
porters, including strategies affecting both the impacts of an
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extortion event, should it occur, and the probability that it
happens by reducing the attractiveness for the exporters to
wield the energy weapon. Three main priorities stand out:
First, diversifying the countries of origin reduces the
potential leverage of each single supplier. Taking this ar-
gument seriously implies that production sites for renew-
able electricity should not be chosen exclusively based on
costs and the quality of the solar or wind resources, but
should also acknowledge the value of spreading the pro-
duction across many countries. This means that it would be
beneficial for Europe to seal electricity trade deals with as
many countries as possible, and possibly limit each coun-
try’s share, in order to avoid a dash for electricity from a
single country with particularly good resources.
Second, increasing the response capacities on the Eu-
ropean side further reduces the leverage of the exporters,
as the impacts of a potential export cut are reduced. This
does not necessarily, or at least not exclusively, mean that
the physical control or spare capacities need to be increased
compared to what is needed to protect the system against
technical failures or natural events. Instead, it means in-
creased demand-response capabilities and, in particular, the
improved integration of the national power systems and
markets, in order to spread the risks and enable a common
European emergency response which is stronger than the
response of single countries alone.
Third, increasing the exporters’ dependence on the
trade will reduce the attractiveness of a politically motivated
export cut as it raises the stakes on the exporter side. This
would in particular require the exporting countries them-
selves to invest in the power stations generating the renew-
able electricity and the export transmission lines. These as-
sets have very high capital costs, and hence they depend
on constant trade to be economical. If the exporters have
made these sunk investments, cutting the exports will be all
the more costly to them, and the incentives for a politically
motivated disruption are lower. Similarly, emphasising lo-
cal participation and benefits in the exporting countries is
likely to benefit European energy security by further rais-
ing the stakes for the importer. Increasing local support and
buy-in for electricity exports would require factors like local
manufacturing of components in North Africa to be empha-
sised stronger, and the hiring of local people to work at the
power stations to be actively encouraged. This, on the other
hand, could make the Supergrid system less attractive to
Europe, as it would pay for the electricity but a large share
of the profits of the electricity trade, as well as a number
of macro-economic advantages, would benefit North Africa
instead of Europe.
This third point also highlights the hotly emphasised is-
sue of ensuring that the exporters have sufficient generation
capacity for their own needs before electricity is exported to
Europe [19]: if, for whatever reason, the exporters have in-
sufficient capacity, they have a very strong incentive to dis-
rupt electricity exports in order to satisfy their own needs.
Hence, ensuring North African electricity sufficiency first
is not only a moral issue of avoiding neo-colonial energy
schemes, but it may prove to be vital also from a Eurocen-
tric security perspective.
In addition to the issues addressed above, two further
points affecting the probability that an extortion event hap-
pens will be discussed here. These points – which essen-
tially also relate to interdependence in the broader sense –
are based on key conclusions from the studies of the Euro-
pean integration process and the growth of common Euro-
pean policies and organisations. Among the strongest con-
clusions in this body of research is that “institutions mat-
ter”. The institutional integration in the EU is driven by
a positive feedback loop of increasing economic integra-
tion and cross-border transactions, which activates suprana-
tional governance (e.g. dispute resolution and rule-making),
which facilitates further expansion of economic integra-
tion and cross-border transaction, which creates a greater
social demand for new supranational governance, and so
on [20, 21]. This institutional integration has changed the
intra-European relations, and it has completely changed the
European perception of international risks of depending on
its neighbours. Applied to the discussion of political risks
connected to the Supergrid vision, this allows for two im-
portant remarks.
First, good relations between Europe and North Africa
will be of crucial importance. This is, of course, a trivial
observation, but it is true and often forgotten in the discus-
sion. Friendly relations both reduce the probability for hos-
tile events to happen and increase the disincentives of an
exporter to extort a partner: it is generally worse to break
trust in a friendly than in a hostile relationship.
Second, the institutional setting greatly affects the pos-
sibilities to use the electricity trade as a political tool, and
institutional integration between Europe and North Africa
may thus prove to be a valuable way to manage the po-
litical risks, and change the perception of these. So far,
much of the Supergrid discussion has viewed the exports as
bulk transfer of dedicated export electricity, distinct from
the general electricity supply framework [22]. This is a
main source for the worries about political extortion risks:
bulk point-to-point transfer is easy to understand, and lends
itself very well to power considerations and analogies to
pipeline gas import vulnerabilities [17]. If, however, the
electricity is allowed to flow freely in a meshed system
on an open European-North African market with common
rules and institutions, the situation is completely different:
it would be physically much more difficult (or impossi-
ble) to cut supply to a particular country, and the legal and
practical possibilities of exporter governments to access en-
ergy trade as a forceful foreign policy instrument are re-
duced.
The value of these two points can be seen in the EU,
where it is all but unthinkable that a government would
seize control over its domestic electricity (or energy) com-
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panies (even if they are state-owned) in order to coax a
neighbouring country into political concessions. This is
not only due to the generally friendly relations within the
EU, but also due to the market structure and regulation, and
the common institutions, which effectively make such ac-
tion impossible and ineffective. The European laws and in-
stitutions outside the electricity and energy sectors add to
this impossibility, and the economic integration raises the
stakes of breaking existing law and aggressively punish-
ing a neighbour country: a government nonetheless going
ahead with (or threatening) such action would most likely
face enormous reputational political (and possibly both di-
rect and indirect economical) costs by being perceived an
unreliable, aggressive partner. The consequence of the de-
velopment of trust and common institutions is that Euro-
pean energy security cares little about in which EU country
the electricity originates: today, electricity from a neigh-
bouring European Union country is viewed as equally se-
cure as domestically produced electricity.
Whether such integration is possible between Europe
and North Africa, and to what extent, remains to be seen.
From today’s perspective, expectations of deeply friendly
relations and institutional integration may seem optimistic
or even naïve, but it is important to recognise the time com-
ponent of a Supergrid decarbonisation process: the physical
and institutional transformation would take place gradually
over 40 years or more. It is certainly naïve to believe that
this integration could happen over night, but at the same
time it would be surprising if common institutions govern-
ing the Supergrid system would not evolve over time, if Eu-
rope and North Africa opt for this decarbonisation pathway.
4 Conclusions
The idea of a renewable Supergrid in which Europe imports
renewable electricity from North Africa is frequently dis-
cussed as risky, due to the possibility of the exporters wield-
ing the “energy weapon” and extorting Europe into politi-
cal or economical concessions. However, recent analysis
has shown that these risks are in fact small. In this article, a
number of cornerstones for strategies to further reduce these
political risks were discussed, by taking an interdependence
perspective and acknowledging the context of a possible fu-
ture electricity trade. These strategies come in three main
shapes:
1. measures to minimise the impacts of an import dis-
ruption, especially by diversifying its supply countries
and by integrating its domestic power systems, would
reduce the European exposure to extortion risk;
2. actively emphasising the benefits for North Africa in
order to increase the exporters’ dependence on the ex-
ports would raise the stakes and reduce the attractive-
ness for the exporter to engage in extortion behaviour;
3. good relations would reduce the probability that a rea-
son for the exporters to behave aggressively emerges,
and deep institutional integration between Europe and
North Africa, not necessarily limited to the electric-
ity sector, would greatly reduce both the incentives
and the possibilities (and hence the probability) for ex-
porter governments to use electricity trade as a politi-
cal tool.
Thus, instead of the intuitive answer to minimise depen-
dence in order to increase energy security, targeted mea-
sures to deepen and foster dependence of both sides on each
other may be a powerful overarching strategy to reduce Eu-
ropean energy security risks in a renewable Supergrid elec-
tricity future.
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